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INTRODUCTION
On December 23, 2016, the United Nations (UN) Security
Council adopted Resolution 2334 by a vote of 14-0 with the United
59
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States abstaining.1 The Resolution addresses the settlements by Israeli citizens in the “Palestinian territory,” including East Jerusalem.2 It bases its position on the so called “4 June 1967 lines,” condemning all acts of terror and supporting a “two-state solution” and
the achievement of peace.3 The Resolution classifies the State of Israel as an “occupying power” that is obligated by the 1949 Fourth
Geneva Convention to protect Civilian Persons in Time of War.4
The Resolution invokes an Advisory Opinion rendered in 2004 by
the International Court of Justice.5
I sustain the following: (1) the positions adopted by the Security
Council have no basis in international law and they contradict the
opinions of the major authorities in this field of law; (2) the International Court of Justice’s 2004 Wall Advisory Opinion on the settlements, which the Resolution invokes, is devoid of any legal value;
(3) there is no such thing as “4 June 1967 lines,” which the Resolution refers to; and (4) the Security Council’s position blatantly ignores historical background, geographical realities, and the legal
precedents related to the Israel-Arab continuous conflict.

*Professor (ret.) State University of Rio de Janeiro Law School, Visiting Professor Brooklyn Law School, N.Y. (1989), Loyola of Los Angeles School of Law
(1990), Capital University of Columbus, OH. (1993), Miami University School
of Law (1990, 1997 and 2005), Hamichlalah Hakademit Lemishpatim, Ramat Gan
(2008), University of Haifa Global Law Program (January 2012), Lecturer at the
Academy of International Law, The Hague (2000). The author thanks Leonel Caraciki, PHD candidate at Ben Gurion University, Israel and Felipe Gomes Albuquerque, assistant professor at Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil for
careful research assistance. Thanks to Ambassador Alan Baker and to Professor
Talia Einhorn for their advice and to Professor Mathias Reimann for having carefully gone over the whole manuscript and given valuable comments. The responsibility for the contents is entirely of the author.
1
U.N. SCOR, 71th Sess., 7853d mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7853 (Dec. 23,
2016); see also Press Release, Security Council, Israel’s Settlements Have No
Legal Validity, Constitute Flagrant Violation of International Law, Security
Council Reaffirms, U.N. Press Release SC/12657 (Dec. 23, 2016),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12657.doc.htm.
2
S.C. Res. 2334, ¶ 4 (Dec. 23, 2016).
3
Id. ¶ 13‒16.
4
Id. ¶ 3.
5
Id.
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Moreover, I claim that the Security Council does not abide by
the principles established in the Charter of the United Nations, requiring the Security Council to follow international law and that the
Security Council has not complied with Resolution 2334.
After reviewing the favorable comments of Professor Theodor
Meron, an eminent figure in the field of international law both as
professor and as judge of various international criminal courts, on
the Resolution,6 I strongly disagree with the points developed by the
illustrious internationalist. While Meron insists on the need of Israel
to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention on humanitarian rights,7
I shall demonstrate that Israel did, and does, effectively comply with
the principles of this Convention. Any Palestinian suffering is the
exclusive result of the Palestinian leadership’s creations of organizations that perpetuate human rights violations. Meron’s refusal to
apply historical and biblical sources to matters of public international law is strongly refuted by demonstrating that the great founders of this field of law in the last few centuries have effectively invoked history and the Bible in connection with various principles of
the law of nations.
Resolution 2334, like numerous manifestations of the Security
Council and of other international organizations, insists on the obligation of establishing peace between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs.8 I will show that the official constitutional documents of the
Palestinian organizations clearly and emphatically advocate for the
destruction of the State of Israel and that this desideratum is present
in every manifestation of the Palestinian leadership, especially when
addressing their people in their language. This contradicts the Israeli
Proclamation of Independence of 1948, which proclaimed the determination to reach a peaceful accord at the time when the neighboring Arab states started their first war against Israel.9
The policies followed by the Palestinians consist of a total rejection of the State of Israel; therefore, all trials to reach a peace accord,
6
Theodor Meron, The West Bank and International Humanitarian Law on
the Eve of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Six-Day War, 111 Aᴍ. J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. 357,
357 (2017).
7
Id. at 374‒75.
8
S.C. Res. 2334, supra note 2, ¶ 3‒6.
9
Proclamation of Independence, 5708 (2) (May 14, 1948) (Isr.),
https://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm.
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including the efforts of U.S. President Bill Clinton, have failed. The
Palestinians are not really ready for any concession even when presented with peace plans, containing an agreement to many of their
demands.
Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, approved immediately
after the Six Day War, clarified that the devolution of territories was
to be conditioned on the attainment of a full-fledged peace.10 This is
in contrast to Resolution 2334, which demands that Israel immediately and completely cease all settlement activities in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, without conditioning
it on the attainment of peace.11 As I will stress further, the settlement
activities are a necessary defense against the terrorist war that the
Palestinians have been waging against the Israeli population.
THE RESOLUTION
Resolution 2334 of the UN Security Council of December 23,
2016, adopted the following statements and stipulations:
1. The establishment of settlements by Israel in the Palestinian
territory, “including East Jerusalem, has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under international law”; this situation
constitutes “a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-State
solution and a just, lasting and comprehensive peace.”12
2. Demands “that Israel immediately and completely cease all
settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, including
East Jerusalem.”13
3. “Underlines that it will not recognize any changes to the ‘4
June 1967 lines’ including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those
agreed by the parties through negotiations.”14
4. “Stresses that the cessation of all Israeli settlement activities
is essential for salvaging the two-State solution.”15

10
11
12
13
14
15

S.C. Res. 242, ¶ 4 (Nov. 22, 1967).
S.C. Res. 2334, supra note 2, ¶ 4.
Id.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 14.
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5. “Calls upon all States . . . to distinguish . . . between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967.”16
6. “Calls for immediate steps to prevent all acts of violence
against civilians,” and for clear condemnation of “all acts of terrorism.”17
7. Calls on both parties “to act on the basis of international
law . . . [and] refrain from provocative actions, incitement and inflammatory rhetoric,” and to rebuild “trust and confidence . . . [in] a
genuine commitment to the two-State solution.18
8-9. Calls and Urges all parties to endeavor efforts viewing the
achievement of peace.19
In its Preamble, Resolution 2334 sets the following points:
1. Inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force.20
2. Classifies the State of Israel as an “occupying power,” which
is obligated by the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention to protect Civilian Persons in Time of War, and refers to the International Court
of Justice 2004 Advisory Opinion.21
3. Condemns “all measures aimed at altering the” demography
of the Palestinian Territory, including the “construction and expansion of settlements, transfer of Israeli settlers, confiscation of land,
demolition of homes and displacement of Palestinian civilians, in
violation of international humanitarian law.”22
4. Expresses concern that these activities imperil “the viability
of the two-State solution based on the 1967 lines.”23
5. Recalls the obligation “for a freeze by Israel of all settlement
activity.”24
6. Recalls the obligation of “the Palestinian Authority Security
Forces to . . . [confront] all those engaged in terror.”25
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶¶ 18‒19.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 7.
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7. Condemns all acts of violence against civilians, acts of terror, provocation, incitement, and destruction.26
8. Reiterates “its vision of a region where two democratic
States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace within secure
and recognized borders.”27
4TH OF JUNE 1967 LINES
The Resolution is based on historic and factual mistakes and various legal misconceptions.
The Resolution refers to “the 4 June 1967 lines.”28 There are no
such lines. On that day, the armed conflict started between Israel and
the offensive military actions of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.29 This is
known as the “Six-Day-War.”30 The only lines that existed were the
armistice lines signed between Israel and the attacking Arab states
after the 1947-1948 war, which is known as the Israel’s War of Independence.31
These armistice lines derived from the cessation of the war
waged by Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon as they invaded
Israel.32 This invasion occurred immediately after the proclamation
of the State based on the UN General Assembly Resolution 181,
which partitioned the disputed land between the Jews and the Arabs.33 The Jews accepted the partition and proclaimed the State of
Israel,34 whereas the Arabs rejected the Resolution, refused the
peaceful solution designed by the United Nations, and invaded the
26

Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 9.
28
Id. ¶ 13.
29
Jeremy Brown, 1967 War: Six Days That Changed the Middle East, BBC
(June 5, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461.
30
Id.
31
See Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, Egypt-Isr., Feb. 24,
1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 251 [hereinafter Egyptian-Israeli Armistice]; Jordan-Israeli
General Armistice Agreement, Jordan-Isr., Apr. 3, 1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 304; Lebanese-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, Leb.-Isr., March 23, 1949, 42
U.N.T.S. 287; Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement, Syria-Isr., July 20,
1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 327.
32
Brown, supra note 29.
33
G.A. Res. 181(II) A-B, Resolution Adopted on the Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Palestinian Question (Nov. 29, 1947).
34
Brown, supra note 29.
27
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newly created state.35 The armistice agreement with Egypt stipulated that “the Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in
any sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated
without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either Party to
the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question.”36 Similar statements were made in the armistice agreements
signed with the other invading Arab States.37 There were no obligatory boundaries as everything was left for a future settlement.38
Instead of settling, the Arabs maintained their animosity towards
the state of Israel. They did not take any initiative in favor of the
creation of a Palestinian state, and after eighteen years, they started
a new war that became known as the “Six-Day War.”39 The Six-Day
War liberated Israel from any obligation regarding the armistice
agreements.40 Consequently, Israel was free to wage a defensive war
and to remain in the territories in accordance with the results of the
war.
Between the 1949 armistice agreements and the Six-Day War,
the Arab states encouraged a succession of belligerent organizations
to attack the population of Israel with continuous acts of terrorism.41
Israel’s retaliatory operations, which were deemed to avoid further
attacks, were always met with condemnations by the UN and the
UN’s unfortunate change of attitude from a peacemaker to an ac-

35

Id.
Egyptian-Israeli Armistice, supra note 31, art. 5.
37
Brown, supra note 35.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 399 (Sir Robert
Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (“Thus during the Arab-Israeli
fighting since 1948 anti-Israeli groups operating from bases in neighboring Arab
states have often from there organized and launched hostile expeditions into Israel.”).
36
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complice of Palestinian terrorism—a continuous campaign of demonization of the State of Israel.42 In the Security Council, the Soviet veto always protected the Arab countries from any condemnation.43
Before the Six-Day War, Egypt (1) closed the Straits of Tiran at
the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba, imposing a naval blockade, which
prevented Israeli ships from reaching the port of Eilat, and (2) closed
the Suez Canal to ships going to or coming from Israel.44 Both arguably constituted casus belli.45
FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949
The Security Council’s Resolution 2334 states that Israel has an
obligation to abide by the rules of the Fourth Geneva Convention
“relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of
August 12, 1949.”46
There are various problems with the attribution of competence
of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the territories referred to by the
Resolution. Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as
Article 2 of the other three Geneva Conventions signed on August
42
See JACOB DOLINGER, THE CASE FOR CLOSING THE UNITED NATIONS:
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A STUDY IN HYPOCRISY 387‒453 (2016) (presenting a long list of UN attitudes and resolutions tainted with the gravest prejudice and greatest injustice, viewing the demonization and de-legitimization of the
State of Israel).
43
Id.
44
This was not the first time that Egypt closed the Suez Canal. S.C. Res. 95,
¶ 4 (Sep. 1, 1951); see also History.com Editors, Six-Day War Ends, HISTORY
(Feb. 29, 2010), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/six-day-war-ends.
45
Definition of Casus Belli, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/casus%20belli (explaining that casus belli is “an event or
action that justifies a war or conflict”); see also S.C. Res. 95, supra note 44, ¶ 4
(noting that “Egypt was interfering with the passage through the Suez Canal of
goods destined for Israel” and that “the restrictions on the passage of goods
through the Suez Canal to Israel ports are denying to nations at no time connected
with the conflict in Palestine valuable supplies required for their economic reconstruction and that these restrictions together with sanctions applied by Egypt to
certain ships which have visited Israel ports represent unjustified interference with
the rights of nations to navigate the seas and to trade freely with one another,
including the Arab states and Israel”).
46
S.C. Res. 2334, supra note 2, ¶ 3.
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2, 1949, refers to all conflicts that “may arise between two or more
of the High Contracting Parties . . . .”47 Besides Israel, there is no
other “contracting party” as the presence of Israel in the West Bank
is in a territory which has never acquired statehood.48 Therefore, the
territories referred to in the Resolution could not be a party to the
Geneva Convention. The Convention expressly states in Article
Four that “nationals of a State, which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it.”49 The persons, which live in a territory
that is not a state, consequently, are not a party to the Convention.50
The Palestinians made successive declarations that it considered itself bound by the Geneva Conventions in 1982, 1989, and 1990.51
But the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, which acts in
name of the Swiss government as the depositary for the Conventions, responded that it was not in a position to decide whether the
communications could be considered as an instrument of accession.52 This was due to the uncertainty within the international community as to the existence or non-existence of a State of Palestine.53
Following the UN General Assembly’s resolution, granting nonmember observer state status to Palestine in 2012, Palestine acceded
to the Conventions of Geneva.54 Can an adhesion to the Conventions
47
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention].
48
S.C. Res. 2334, supra note 2, ¶ 4 (explaining that Resolution 2334 recognizes that it refers to “altering the demographic composition, character and status
of the Palestinian Territory”; whereas, the Geneva Conventions deal with states,
not territories).
49
Geneva Convention, supra note 47, art. 4.
50
Eugene Rostow, Correspondence, Aᴍ. J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. 717, 719 (1990) (“The
West Bank is not the territory of a signatory power, but an unallocated part of the
British Mandate. It is hard, therefore, to see how even the most narrow and literalminded reading of the Convention could make it apply to the process of Jewish
settlement in territories of the British Mandate west of the Jordan River.”).
51
Information Notice, SWISS FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(Dec. 11, 1990), https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/fr/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/geneve/901211-GENEVE_e.pdf.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
G.A. Res. 67/229, Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources (Dec. 21, 2012).
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45 years after the beginning of the settlements have retroactive effects?
Theodor Meron, who harshly criticizes the building of settlements in the territories, says that in his opinion, “these measures
deny contiguity and visibility to any future independent Palestinian
entity, not to mention a state.”55 By which, he correctly recognizes
that the territories do not constitute a state, not even an entity, in
exact accordance with one of the main points of Israel’s position in
defense of its policies. Meron’s basic argument about the applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Israel-Palestinian situation is
that “High Contracting Parties” referred to in the second paragraph
of the second article of the Geneva Convention is not relevant to the
situation of the West Bank because the applicable rule is that of the
first paragraph of the second article.56 This paragraph also refers to
“High Contracting Parties” so it could just as well serve to found
Israel’s legal position. The fact that “occupation” only appears in
paragraph two and not in paragraph one is irrelevant as the various
dispositions of the Convention amount to one basic policy, and they
all apply exclusively to states that are among the “High Contracting
Parties.” Actually, because Meron throughout his article deals with
the occupation factor, paragraph 2 should be the applicable rule.
Moreover, according to Article Six of the Convention, its application ceases on the general close of military operations and in the
case of occupied territory,57 the application ceases one year after the
general close of military operations.58 In this case, military operations ended fifty years ago.59 Beyond the first year, the Convention
maintains a few rules in force exclusively for the protection of the

55

Meron, supra note 6, at 360.
Id. at 363; see Geneva Convention, supra note 47. Article 2 of the Geneva
Convention states that (1) “[i]n addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared
war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the
High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them,” and (2) “[t]he Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation
meets with no armed resistance.” Geneva Convention, supra note 47.
57
Geneva Convention, supra note 47, art. 6.
58
Id.
59
Id.
56
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rights of individuals of humanitarian character provided that the occupier exercises the functions of government in the territory.60 This
is not the case in the West Bank, where the Palestinian Authority is
the governing power. Moreover, the Resolution fails to indicate
which issues of individual humanitarian protection have been disrespected by Israel. The Resolution also ignores the grave violations
of basic human rights practiced by the Palestinian governing bodies
against their own people, which include the following: (1) the suppression of criticism, (2) the public executions with no due process
of law of Arabs suspected of collaborating with Israel, (3) the lack
of freedom of expression, (4) the expropriation of private property
without judicial order, and (5) the many other violations of basic
human rights. A simple illustration of the projected Palestinian state
is the fact that Mahmoud Abbas, elected for a four-year term in early
2005, continues in power eight years beyond his mandate, ruling
with dictatorial powers.61
ISRAEL’S HUMANITARIAN POLICY
Israel has indeed abided by the humanitarian provisions of the
Geneva Convention, announcing its position in a letter to the International Committee of the Red Cross as follows:
Israel maintains that in view of the sui generis status
of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, the de jure applicability of the Fourth Convention to these areas is
doubtful. Israel prefers to leave aside the legal question of the status of these areas and has decided, since
1967, to act de facto in accordance with the humanitarian provisions of the Convention.62
An important illustration of the treatment the Palestinians receive from Israel is the attitude of the Israeli Supreme Court towards

60

Id.
Khaled Abu Toameh, Palestinians: Naming Abbas as PM violates basic
law, JERUSALEM POST (Feb. 8, 2012), at A1.
62
Cf. Nissim Bar-Yaacov, The Applicability of the Laws of War to Judea and
Samaria (the West Bank) and to the Gaza Strip, 24 Isʀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 485, 489 (1990).
61
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Palestinians. First, the Supreme Court could very easily avoid judging any claim of the Palestinians because they are not located within
Israel’s territory, and thus, there is no jurisdiction. But the contrary
has occurred. Any request, complaint, or other approach of the Palestinians to the Israeli Supreme Court is duly examined and decided
upon.63 While Palestinians are limited to lower courts in land cases,
in other cases, the Palestinians have been successful in attaining
their requests from the Supreme Court.64
In Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, the
Supreme Court decided whether a fence that the government was
erecting as protection against terrorist attacks would disturb the lives
of the inhabitants of the Beit Sourik village.65 The Supreme Court
requested and received various analyses from experts that ranged
from military matters and humanitarian principles to the principle of
proportionality66 and decided that the fence, which in itself the Supreme Court considered perfectly legal, demonstrating the error of
the contrary opinion of the International Court of Justice, should
change its route in order to ease the life of the inhabitants of that
particular village.67 This change, according to the expert assessments received, would still protect the safety of the Israeli population.68 Considering all the evidence presented, the Supreme Court
decided which segments of the fence illegally violated the rights of
the Arab population and which segments were legal in accordance
with international law.69
63

Tovah Lazaroff, Committee OK’s Bill Limiting Palestinian Access to High
Court of Justice, JERUSALEM POST (July 12, 2018), https://www.jpost.com/IsraelNews/Comittee-OKs-bill-limiting-Palestinian-access-to-High-Court-of-Justice562283.
64
Id.
65
HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel 58(5)
P.D.
807,
807
(2004)
(Isr.),
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/04/560/020/A28/04020560.A28.pdf [hereinafter Beit Sourik Village] (Reprinted with permission of the Israeli Supreme
Court and available at www.court.go.il); see also HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village v. Government of Israel 58(5) P.D. 807, 38 Isʀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 83 (2005) (English
translation of decision).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
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Aharon Barak, the president of the court, referred in his opinion
in Beit Sourik to another case—Ajuri v. IDF Commander—where
he had described the security situation prevalent in Israel:
Israel’s fight is complex. Together with other means,
the Palestinian use guided human bombs. These suicide bombers reach every place where Israelis can be
found (within the boundaries of the State of Israel
and in the Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria
and the Gaza Strip). They sow destruction and spill
blood in the cities and towns. The forces fighting
against Israel are terrorists, they are not members of
a regular army; they do not wear uniforms; they hide
among the Palestinian population in the territories,
including inside holy sites; they are supported by part
of the civilian population and by their families and
relatives.70
In this decision, the Supreme Court described the systematic and
careful procedures followed by the Israeli authorities for the erection
of the fence,71 which characterize the respect and consideration of
the Israeli authorities to the Arab population of the West Bank. This
is the description:
Parts of the separation fence are being erected on
land which is not privately owned. Other parts are
being erected on private land. In such circumstances
– and in light of the security necessities – an order of
seizure is issued by the Commander of the IDF forces
in the area of Judea and Samaria. Pursuant to standard procedure, every land owner whose land is seized
will receive compensation for the use of his land. After the order of seizure is signed, it is brought to the
attention of the public, and proper liaison body of the
Palestinian Authority is contacted. An announcement is relayed to the residents, and each interested
party is invited to participate in a survey of the area
70
71

HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander 56(6) PD 352, 358 (2002) (Isr.).
Beit Sourik Village, supra note 65.
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affected by the order of seizure, . . . . A few days after
the order is issued, a survey is taken of the area, with
the participation of the landowners, in order to point
out the land which is about to be seized.
After the survey, a one week leave is granted to the
landowners, so that they may submit an appeal to the
military commander. The substance of the appeal is
examined. Where it is possible, an attempt is made to
reach understanding with the landowner. If the appeal is denied, leave of one additional week is given
to the land owner, so that he may petition the High
Court of Justice.72
As the various cases that were judged by the Supreme Court of
Israel demonstrate, the arguments of the Arab owners are taken in
due consideration, experts’ opinions are accepted and examined, and
the Supreme Court considers whether the direction of a fence should
be modified. In some cases, this is exactly what happens and the
court orders the military authorities to modify the direction of the
fence.
It would be very difficult, if possible at all, to indicate a similar
respectful attitude to the people of an occupied land by an occupying
authority or by any court in the civilized world at any time.
The concluding paragraph of this decision is an important contribution to the major modern legal problem – Democracy versus
Terrorism. It reads as follows:
Our task is difficult. We are members of Israeli society. Although we are sometimes in an ivory tower,
that tower is in the heart of Jerusalem, which is not
infrequently hit by ruthless terror. We are aware of
the killing and destruction wrought by the terror
against the state and its citizens. As any other Israelis, we too recognize the need to defend the country
and its citizens against the wounds inflicted by terror.
We are aware that in the short term, this judgment
will not make the state’s struggle against those rising
72

Id.
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up against it easier. But we are judges. When we sit
in judgment, we are subject to judgment. We act according to our best conscience and understanding.
Regarding the state’s struggle against the terror that
rises against it, we are convinced that at the end of
the day, a struggle according to the law will
strengthen her power and her spirit. There is no security without law. Satisfying the provision of the
law is an aspect of national security.73
Israel’s presence brought positive results to the economy of the
territories and to the health conditions of the Palestinian population.74 For example, from 1967 to 2000, life expectancy increased
from 48 to 72, and infant mortality plummeted from 60 per thousand
live births to 15.75 This occurred as Israel built more than one hundred clinics, offered comprehensive health insurance, and modernized and expanded sewage and electrical infrastructures.76 In the political arena, under Israeli rule, the Palestinians of Judea, Samaria,
and Gaza exercised political freedoms. This included “freedom of
the press, freedom of association, enfranchisement of women and
the ability to seek the protection of the Israeli court system.”77
And then came the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement
on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, “when 98 percent of the Palestinians living in these areas came under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority . . . which ended the freedoms the Palestinians

73
Id. at 132; see also Dolinger, supra note 42, at 382‒386. This is the essence
of Justice Barak’s legal philosophy regarding the need to conciliate democracy
and human rights with the defense of the state and its citizens; a philosophy that
has its adherents but also its adversaries. Among those who have strongly disagreed with Justice Barak stands Richard Posner, judge on the US Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit and professor at the University of Chicago Law School.
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CAROLINE B. GLICK, THE ISRAELI SOLUTION: A ONE-STEP PLAN FOR PEACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST 113‒14 (2014).
75
Id.
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Id. On the other hand, the same author wrote in her Jerusalem Post column
about how the PLO transformed their lives into chaos by implementing the law of
the jungle, enforced by mob-style militias, which trampled property rights and
gutted civil rights.
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Id.
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had enjoyed under Israeli rule and torpedoed their economy.”78
These facts, as they evolved in the 1990s, demonstrate the harsh injustice that Israel suffers when the Security Council ironically orders
the Jewish State to extend humanitarian protection to the Palestinians.
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ) ADVISORY
OPINION
The Resolution invokes the Advisory Opinion rendered on July
9, 2004, by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).79 This is the advisory opinion regarding the fence (which the ICJ called the wall)
that Israel erected to defend its citizens from the daily terrorist attacks by Arabs living in the territories.80
In the first place, an ICJ Advisory Opinion is not a binding legal
source.81 It is a mere opinion furnished by the court to the General
Assembly of the UN.82 As its denomination indicates, it is an advisory opinion and not a judgment. Thus, an advisory opinion is a decision of political—and not legal—nature. As a matter of fact, it is
known that some of the judges of the ICJ rule in accordance with
the interests and or policies of the states of their citizenship.83 This
occurs as they are sent to serve at the ICJ by their nation’s governments.84 Amichai Cohen observes that “the identity of the judges in
78

Id. at 116, 119. Caroline Glick’s advocacy of a “One State Plan for Peace
in the Middle East” is based on the rationale that “[a]pplying Israeli law to the
areas would end the authoritarian repression that the Palestinians suffer under the
rule of the Palestinian Authority. As permanent residents of Israel, with the option
of applying for Israeli citizenship, the Palestinians would find themselves living
in a liberal democracy where their individual rights are protected.” Id. at 119. The
author informs that during the Palestinian uprising against Israel from 1988 to
1991, Palestinians killed about a thousand of their own people whom they accused
of collaborating with Israel. Id. at 116, 119.
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S.C. Res. 2334, supra note 2, ¶ 3.
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Rep. of the I.C.J, at 4, U.N. Doc A/59/4 (Aug. 1, 2003 – July 31, 2004).
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See Advisory Proceedings, I.C.J., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/how-thecourt-works (last visited Oct. 12, 2018); see also The Court, I.C.J., http://www.icjcij.org/en/court (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).
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Id.
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Eric Posner & Miguel F.P.de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice, Biased?, 34 Tʜᴇ J. ᴏꜰ Lᴇɢᴀʟ Sᴛᴜᴅ. 599, 599, 624 (2005).
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international courts, their politics, values and independence from
political control should become major issues in the debate over international law.”85
It is important to analyze the 2004 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ
to perceive the depth of the Security Council’s one-sidedness in Resolution 2334.86 It is also important to compare the Resolution to similar Resolutions of the General Assembly and the Council of Human
Rights, which are entirely prejudiced regarding the position and the
policies of Israel.87 This analysis will demonstrate how the UN organs have no problem making decisions and resolutions on the Israel-Arab conflict in spite of all evidence and against elementary
common sense.
The 2004 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ is in total conflict with
the facts that brought about the occupation. It is tainted by flagrant
incorrect descriptions of the successive events that form the ongoing
Middle East conflict. Moreover, the 2004 Advisory Opinion includes a short historical review, which refers to the War of Independence of 1948 in the following terms: “Israel proclaimed its independence on the strength of the General Assembly resolution;
armed conflict broke out between Israel and a number of Arab States
and the Plan of Partition was not implemented.”88 Here, the ICJ tries
to hide the universally known fact that the Arab states, unwilling to
accept the proclamation of the State of Israel, attacked and invaded
the territory designated by the UN Partition Plan to become the Jewish State.
How can the Court, an integral part of the UN, ignore the statement of Trygve Lie, the first secretary general of the same organization? Lie stated, “The invasion of Palestine by the Arab States was
the first armed aggression which the world has seen since the world
85

Amichai Cohen, Rules and Applications of International Humanitarian
Law, 41 Isʀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 41, 67 (2008).
86
S.C. Res. 2334, supra note 2, ¶ 3.
87
See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9),
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-00EN.pdf [hereinafter Construction Advisory Opinion].
88
Id. ¶ 71, at 165; see also GA, Res. 181(II) A-B, Resolution Adopted on the
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question (Nov. 29, 1947),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/181(II).
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war.”89 Paul Johnson, an internationally respected historian, describes the aggression as follows: “A provisional government was
formed immediately. Egyptian air raids began that night. The next
day, simultaneously, the last British left and the Arab armies invaded.”90
The Egyptian newspaper, Akhbar al-Yom, quoted the Secretary
General of the Arab League Azzam Pasha at a Cairo press conference. He said, “[T]his will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre . . . like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades.”91
At the UN Security Council’s meeting on May 15, 1948, Mr.
Tarasenko, the representative of Ukraine, referred to the armed
struggle happening in Palestine. He referred to it as “a result of the
unlawful invasion by a number of States of the territory of Palestine,
which does not form part of the territory of any of the States whose
armed forces have invaded it,”92 and in the same vein, the United
States delegate, Senator Austin, referring specifically to Jordan’s attitude and its answers to questions posed by the Security Council,
classified the Arab state’s behavior as waging a war and acting
against peace.93
The ICJ’s inaccurate statement that “armed conflict then broke
out” does not bode well for the prestige of any court, let alone the
ICJ.94 But when prejudice reigns, there is no limit to the level of
misrepresentations that can occur. The lack of legal value of the
ICJ’s 2004 Advisory Opinion lies in its conclusions, which are
based on uncertainty and are self-contradicting.
In paragraph 137 in the 2004 Advisory Opinion, the ICJ states
the following: “To sum up, the Court, from the material available to
it, is not convinced that the specific course Israel has chosen for the
89

DORE GOLD, THE FIGHT FOR JERUSALEM: RADICAL ISLAM, THE WEST, AND
THE FUTURE OF THE HOLY CITY 135 (2007).
90
PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE JEWS 527 (1988).
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David Barnett & Efraim Karsh, Azzam’s Genocidal Threat, 18(4) MIDDLE
EAST Q. 85, 87 (2011) (translating Mustafa Amin, A War of Extermination,
AKHBAR AL-YOM, Oct. 11, 1947).
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Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of
Judea and Samaria, 3 ISR. L. REV. 279, 279 (1968); Id. at 285‒86.
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Id. at 9.
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Construction Advisory Opinion, supra note 87, ¶ 71, at 165.
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wall was necessary to attain its security objectives.”95 Paragraph 140
repeats the legal jewel: “In the light of the material before it, the
Court is not convinced that the construction of the wall along the
route chosen was the only means to safeguard the interest of Israel
against the peril which it invoked as justification for that construction.”96 However, the strangest aspect of the ICJ’s conclusion is the
continuation on paragraph 137: “The wall, along the route chosen,
and its associated régime gravely infringe a number of rights of Palestinians residing in the territory occupied by Israel, and the infringements resulting from that route cannot be justified by military
exigencies or by the requirements of national security or public order.”97
Thus, the ICJ makes two statements that contradict each other in
the same paragraph. The ICJ is not convinced that (1) the route chosen for the wall was the only way to protect the Israeli population,
and (2) infringements caused to the Palestinian population by the
route chosen cannot be justified by military exigencies, national security, or public order.
At the same time, the Court is not convinced, and yet it decides
with conviction! Which court takes a decision based on doubt, on
lack of conviction? Why did the Court not order technical, geographical, strategical, and military advice? Why did it not look into
Israel’s arguments contained in a document that the Secretary General of the UN attached to the consultation for an Advisory Opinion
as this paper is hardly referred to in the decision?98
Israel argued that in the forty months immediately preceding the
erection of the fence, Palestinian terror attacks had left 916 people
dead and over 5,000 injured, many of them critically.99 There is no
word about that in the General Assembly’s request for an advisory
opinion. Despite the unforgiveable omission by the General Assembly, the ICJ could have easily looked into the Israeli submission and
95

Id. ¶ 137, at 193.
Id. ¶ 140, at 194.
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Id. ¶ 137, at 193.
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Letter from the Deputy Director General and Legal Advisor of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, together with the Written Statement of the Government of Israel, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/131/1579.pdf; Construction Advisory Opinion, supra note 87.
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double-checked the facts related, but it did not really care to search
for the truth.
Judge Rosalyn Higgins was very critical of the Court. In her separate opinion, she states:
Addressing the reality that “the question of the construction of the wall was only one aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” the Court states that it “is
indeed aware that the question of the wall is part of a
greater whole and it would take this circumstance
carefully into account in any opinion it might give.”
In fact, it never does so. There is nothing in the remainder of the Opinion that can be said to cover this
point. Further, I find the “history” as recounted by
the Court in paragraphs 71-76 neither balanced nor
satisfactory.100
The Court says that “[i]n the 1967 armed conflict, Israel forces
occupied all the territories which had constituted Palestine under the
British Mandate (including those known as the West Bank, lying to
the east of the Green Line).”101 Again, the Court reveals unforgiveable historical errors because the territories that constituted Palestine
under British Mandate included the following: (1) the territory
which became the State of Israel, (2) the territories known as the
West Bank, which was supposed to become the Arab State according to Resolution 181 of the General Assembly,102 and (3) the territory known before as Transjordan, which is known today as the independent state of Jordan. In sum, Israel did not occupy the state of
Jordan and could not occupy its own territory; this shows the absurdity of the statement that Israel occupied “all the territories which
had constituted Palestine under the British Mandate.”103
In sum, when the Security Council bases Resolution 2334 on the
ICJ’s 2004 Advisory Opinion, one should bear in mind that both
organs of the UN—the Court and the Council—coincide in their un100

Construction Advisory Opinion, supra note 87, ¶¶ 15‒16, at 211 (separate
opinion by Higgins, J.).
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Construction Advisory Opinion, supra note 87, ¶ 73, at 166.
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fair, unjust, illegal, and deliberately prejudicial one-sidedness regarding the conflict in the Holy Land. In Brian McGarry’s introductory note to the Resolution, he suggests that the Security Council’s
upgraded language from “calls upon” to “demands” is a consequence of the ICJ’s intervening opinion in Wall,104 “in which the
Court found that Israeli settlement activities had contravened international law.”105 The Resolution is as incorrect as the ICJ’s 2004
Advisory Opinion and both are illegal as I hereby proceed to expose.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
When the Security Council emits a Resolution that deals with
the legal validity of an act or a behavior, establishes legal obligations, and demands certain actions or abstentions from a UN member state, as contained in Resolution 2334, the Council should base
it on legal sources. An ICJ advisory opinion does not represent a
legal source.
Article 38 of the International Court of Justice Statute provides
that the ICJ’s function is “to decide in accordance with international
law” by applying “international conventions . . . international custom . . . the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” and the “judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of the rule of law.”106 The letter of the law, the
text of a convention, and the nature of a custom can only be understood and applied in accordance with the most qualified jurists’ interpretation and the Courts’ application of them. These two sources
are known as Doctrine and Jurisprudence.
Article 68 provides that “[i]n the exercise of its advisory functions the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the present Statute which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which

104
Brian McGarry, Introductory Note to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334, 56(3) I.L.M. 645, 646 (2017), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-legal-materials/article/united-nations-security-council-resolution-2334/EBF1E6E5C132BDE13F6AB63173B281BE.
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Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1(a)‒(d), June 26,
1945, 59 STAT. 1055.
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it recognizes them to be applicable.”107 Should we say that the ICJ
decided the sources of international law stated in Article 38 were not
applicable to the Advisory Opinion request regarding the “wall?”.
Or, in other words, the Opinion would not be given in accordance
with the sources of International Law. If so, the Opinion would not
carry any legal effect. Therefore, the Opinion certainly does not
carry any legal effect, and the reference to it by the Security Council
is absolutely useless as the Council insists on the legal aspects of the
issues under consideration and deals with the international obligations of the State of Israel.
But it is not only the Rules of the ICJ that order the observance
of international law. The whole structure of the United Nations established in its Charter, approved in San Francisco, California on
June 26 1945, is based on this major principle.108
The Preamble states the determination of the organization “to
establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can
be maintained.”109 Additionally, the Charter provides that “international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of peace”
shall be settled “in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.”110 In Article 13, the Charter charges the General
Assembly to “initiate studies and make recommendations for the
purpose of (1) promoting international cooperation in the political
field and (2) encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification.”111 The Charter also prescribes that
the Security Council will discharge its duties “in accordance with
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations,”112 which, as we
saw, are based on “the principles of justice and international law.”113
So when the Security Council states in Resolution 2334 that Israel’s occupation of territories and establishment of settlements in
107
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the Palestinian territory constitute a “flagrant violation under international law,”114 referring to Israel’s “legal obligations,”115 we
should assume that these peremptory statements have a basis in international law and that the sources of international law for the Security Council (as for the General Assembly) cannot be other than
the ones for the ICJ as established in its charter. This is what must
be analyzed. Does the position of the Security Council in Resolution
2334, like many previous resolutions of outright condemnation of
Israel’s presence in the West Bank, have any basis on the authentic
sources of international law?
In 1967, the Israeli army entered the Jordan River’s west bank,
a territory occupied by Jordan and now known as West Bank.116 As
Stuart Malawer wrote, “the Security Council and the General Assembly refused to censure Israel for its 1967 attack against the Arabs. The failure to censure Israel evidences an acceptance by the
international community of the Israeli case . . . .117 This evidences a
development of the United Nations’ practice, which allows a state
to exercise under Article 51 anticipatory self-defense.”118
Louis Henkin stated this theory very laconically: “If a nation is
satisfied that another is about to obliterate it, it will not wait. But it
has to make that decision on its own awesome responsibility.”119
This theory appears very clearly in D.W. Greig as he writes that the
“pre-emptive attack launched by Israel principally against the
United Arab Republic in June 1967, is an excellent illustration of
the circumstances in which a right of anticipatory self-defense might
still be claimed.”120
The next step is to verify the legality of Israel’s permanence in
the territories occupied during the defensive war. A short editorial
comment published by the American Journal of International Law
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(AJIL), which became a classic, fundamental piece for understanding the legal status of the territories, describes two errors.121 Stephen
Schwebel, former judge and president of the International Court of
Justice, distinguished between aggressive conquest and defensive
conquest (I) and between taking territory which the prior holder held
lawfully and that which it had unlawfully (II).122
Schwebel explains that “Israel has a better title in the territory of
what was Palestine, including the whole of Jerusalem, than do Jordan and Egypt.”123 Thus, it follows that the modification of the 1949
armistice lines among those states within former Palestinian territory are lawful if not necessarily desirable. Schwebel further stresses
that “Egypt’s seizure of the Gaza strip, and Jordan’s seizure and subsequent annexation of the West Bank and the old city of Jerusalem,
were unlawful.”124 The seizures could not give these states “lawful,
indefinite control, whether as occupying Power or sovereign: ex injuria jus non oritur.”125 On the same line and adding an interesting
point of law, Elihu Lauterpacht summarized the situation:
Territorial change cannot properly take place as a result of the unlawful use of force. But to omit the word
‘unlawful’ is to change the substantive content of the
rule and to turn an important safeguard of legal principle into an aggressor’s charter. For if force can
never be used to effect lawful territorial change, then,
if territory has once changed hands as a result of the
unlawful use of force, the illegitimacy of the position
thus established is sterilized by the prohibition upon
the use of force to restore the lawful sovereign. This
cannot be regarded as reasonable or correct.126
Comparing the post-1967 standing of Israel with that of pre1967 Jordan, Yehuda Blum added:
121
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The legal standing of Israel in the territories in question is thus that of a State which is lawfully in control
of territory in respect of which no other state can
show a better title. Or, if it is preferred to state the
matter in terms of belligerent occupation, then the legal standing of Israel in the territories in question is
at the very least that of a belligerent occupant of territory in respect of which Jordan is not entitled to the
reversionary rights of a legitimate sovereign.127
Julius Stone characterizes Israel as a “lawful belligerent occupant.”128 He further states that “the status of these residual territories
is not merely, as is too often assumed, that of territories under belligerent occupation; it is rather that of continuing dedication to the
objectives of the mandate.” 129
When Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq attacked Israel on June 5, 1967,
they violated the 1949 armistice agreements.130 Israel’s “occupation
of foreign territory” does not make legal sense because once the armistice boundaries were nullified, the West Bank reverted to its status as Palestine. After the Arabs rejected the partition plan approved
by the UN General Assembly in November 1947, the whole territory
returned to its status of “land promised to the Jews” by the Balfour
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Declaration,131 which was later approved by the League of Nations
through the mandate given to Great Britain at the San Remo Peace
Conference in its Resolution of April 25, 1920.
Following the establishment of the British Mandate, the League
of Nations determined in 1922, in accordance with article 22 of its
Covenant, the conditions of the Mandate over Palestine and
“charged the Mandatory government with the responsibility of establishing a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.”132
The preamble to the British Mandate Document states it was
based on the international recognition of “the historical connection
of the Jewish people with Palestine.”133 Article Two rests the responsibility of “placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of
the Jewish national home” on Britain.134 Article Six requires the
Mandatory Power to ‘facilitate Jewish immigration,’ and Article
Seven made Britain responsible for “enacting a nationality law . . .
framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship
by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.”135
There is no mention of Arab national rights in the Palestine Mandate, and there is no reference to political rights of the non-Jewish
131
Bᴀʟꜰᴏᴜʀ Dᴇᴄʟᴀʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ (1917), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/balfour.asp. Declaration delivered by the British foreign secretary Lord Arthur Balfour to Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild on November 2, 1917, whereby
“[h]is Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of
a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall
be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish
communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any
other country.” Id.
132
Talia Einhorn, The Status of Judea & Samaria (The West Bank) and Gaza
and the Settlements in International Law, 7 JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFF. §1,
§ 3.1 (2014).
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Palestine Mandate (July 24, 1922), in ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND
CONCILIATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 35‒36 (Bernard Reich ed., 1995)
(“The principal Allied powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd,
1917, by establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it
being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the
civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the
rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”).
134
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population because the object and purpose of the British Mandate
was exclusively to “reconstitute the political ties of the Jewish people to their homeland.”136 The British Mandate only provides that
“nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities.”137
The League of Nations’ creation of the British Mandate was the
world entity’s recognition of the right of the Jewish people to establish its home in the Land of Israel, its historic homeland, and to establish its state therein. Thus, the right of the Jews to their homeland
was recognized in international law.
This recognition was inherited by the United Nations as per article 80 of its Charter which established the following:
Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements . . . nothing in this Chapter shall be
construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the
rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the
terms of existing international instruments to which
Members of the United Nations may respectively be
parties.138
The establishment of a national home for the Jewish people was
tied to the whole of geographical Palestine encompassed by the territory from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, covering
what is presently the official territory of Israel, as well as the territories claimed by the Palestinian Arabs. Geographic Palestine became so after Great Britain detached the territory beyond the Jordan
river, known as “Transjordan” to create the Jordanian state, which,
originally, was part of historical Palestine and the British Mandate.139
The continuous terrorism, which Palestinian Arabs waged
against Palestinian Jews practically throughout the whole Mandate
period led the UN to depart from the British Mandate’s objective
136
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and approve a partition plan. The plan divided what remained from
the Palestinian territory into two parts. One for the Jews to create
their state and one for the Palestinian Arabs to create theirs.140 Despite the abandonment of the original British plan approved by the
League of Nations, which stated that the entire territory would end
up as the Jewish State, the Jews of Palestine agreed with the partition
for the sake of peace,141 whereas the Palestinian Arabs as well as the
Arab States did not accept it.142 The United Nations did nothing to
enforce the Partition Plan and Israel was accepted to the UN without
being required to accept the boundaries proposed by that resolution.143
As the Jewish State was about to be born, the Arabs attacked and
invaded its territory and, as we shall further quote, the Palestinian
Arabs declared the illegality of the Partition Plan. 144 The war waged
by the Arab States ended with the agreements which established the
armistice lines, whereas the territory that had been destined by the
UN for the Palestinian Arabs ended up occupied illegally by Jordan.145 This illegal occupation lasted from 1948 to 1967 when the
Arab countries opened another war against Israel – the Six Day War
– which ended with Israel – in a defensive war - expelling the Jordanians from the territory they had illegally occupied. This is what
Stephen Schwebel is referring to when he compares the presence of
Israel with the former occupation by the Jordanians – a legal occupation versus an illegal occupation. In 1988, Jordan declared that it
no longer considered itself as having any status over that area, so the
legality of Israel’s presence in the territories reached to full consolidation.146
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THEODOR MERON’S VIEWS
Theodor Meron affirms that “Jordan would certainly be considered as the legitimate power, even under the Armistice Agreement
of April 3, 1949.”147 Meron references Article 43 of the Hague Convention (IV), which refers to “the authority of the legitimate power
having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant.”148 Meron is
probably the only legal authority that did not accept Schwebel’s position: Jordan was an illegitimate occupier. A position that has been
agreed with by all scholars who wrote on the Six Day War and the
occupation of the West Bank that followed. With the exception of
the United Kingdom and Pakistan, Jordan’s annexation of the Palestinian territory it occupied was not accepted by the world community.149 Jordan later officially renounced150 any claim of any part of
the West Bank, which must also be taken into consideration.
However, Meron goes further and claims, with reference to Article 42, that a “territory is considered occupied when it is actually
placed under the authority of the hostile army.”151 That “a hostile
army in this context means, of course, the armed forces of Israel.”152
This is a total denial of the fact that Israel’s army entered the West
Bank in order to save the State of Israel and its population from annihilation by the invading Arab armies. The Arab armies of Egypt,
Syria, and Jordan were the aggressive and hostile armies,153 whereas
Israel’s army was a defensive army.154 This is clear from the various
legal authorities referred to above.155 Meron lived in Israel at the
time of that treacherous attack and should know better. The same
way Israel’s army is not a “hostile army,” the West Bank is not a
“hostile state,” as Meron puts it, regarding the obligation established
by the Hague Convention to “safeguard the real estate belonging to
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the hostile state.”156 The West Bank was not a state in 1967 and is
not a state today, and so, it cannot be considered a “hostile state.”
When Meron refers to the Fourth Geneva Convention rules regarding the occupier’s obligation “to assume active responsibility
for the welfare of the population under its control,”157 he seems to
be unaware that presently, the West Bank’s Arab population is under
the control of the Palestinian governmental organizations that have
total freedom to act according to their policies. These Palestinian
governmental organizations maintain a tremendously hostile educational, religious, and propaganda regime towards the State of Israel
and the Israeli settlers in the West Bank. Meron prefers to rely on
non-governmental organizations like Human Rights Watch and
B’Tselem,158 which are known for their formidable prejudice
against the State of Israel.159 Meron claims that “individual Palestinians’ human rights, as well as their rights under the Fourth Geneva Convention, are being violated.”160 That is true, but the violator
is the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), not the State of
Israel. The PLO does not allow freedom of press, freedom of expression, or all other fundamental human rights in the areas under
its control.161 In the areas that were subjected to the Israeli authorities’ control until the mid-1990s, the restrictions suffered by Palestinians were exclusively related to Israeli security measures, in order
to provide defense from terrorist acts.162 The same holds for the
fence raised by Israel around Arab centers of population.163 This
156
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fence was exclusively for security protection as clearly established
by the Israeli Supreme Court’s decisions supra.164
To sum up, between 1947 and 1948, the Palestinian Arabs had a
chance to proclaim their state as the Jews proclaimed the State of
Israel. But the Palestinian Arabs refused to accept the General Assembly’s Resolution 181. The Palestinian Arabs did not proclaim
their state and so did not achieve independence. Additionally, Jordan illegally occupied that part of the Mandatory Palestine. Therefore, we must go back in history and accept that the so called “territories” do belong to Israel. These territories became the home for
the Jewish people via the Balfour Declaration, confirmed by the
League of Nations’ mandate of the British, and inherited by the
United Nations as successor of the League of Nations. This follows
the doctrine accepted in customary international law of Uti possidetis iuris which determines the territorial sovereignty in the era of
decolonization.165 This doctrine states that those “emerging from decolonization shall presumptively inherit the colonial administrative
borders that they held at the time of independence.”166 Bell and Kontorovich state that “applied to the case of Israel, uti possidetis juris
would dictate that Israel inherit the boundaries of the Mandate of
Palestine as they existed in May, 1948. The doctrine, thus, would
support Israeli claims to any or all of the currently hotly disputed
areas of Jerusalem (including East Jerusalem), the West Bank, and
even potentially the Gaza Strip (though not the Golan heights).”167
As I stated before, the refusal of the Palestinians to accept Resolution 181 annulled Israel’s renunciation to those parts of the British Mandate territories. Consequently, the territories returned to
their original status as established by the Mandate and confirmed by
the UN Charter.168 To characterize Israel’s presence in the territories
164
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as an “illegal occupation,” as alleged by the Security Council and
accepted by Meron, contradicts the legal international declarations
and resolutions from the last one hundred years, which confirmed
the history of thousands of years.
THE NATURE OF THE “OCCUPATION”
After examining the historical and legal matters involved, the
Levy Report asserted that they:
[R]estored the legal status of the territory to its original status, i.e., territory designated to serve as the
national home of the Jewish people, which retained
its ‘right of possession’ during the period of the Jordanian control, but was absent from the area for a
number of years due to the war that was forced on it,
but has since returned.”169
The Report adds that though “Israel has had every right to claim
sovereignty over these territories, . . . [Israel] opted to adopt a pragmatic approach in order to enable peace negotiation with the representatives of the Palestinian people and the Arab states.”170 The Report adds that Israel “has never viewed itself as an occupying power
in the classic sense of the term, and subsequently, has never taken
upon itself to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention to the territories
of Judea, Samaria and Gaza.”171
Indeed, the territories are not “occupied” in the sense of the Geneva Convention. They are not “occupied” because this agreement
is designed to assure the reversion of the former legitimate sovereign, which in the case of the territories does not exist as the territories had been illegally occupied by the state of Jordan.172 Another
argument has been invoked: because the parties to the conflict were
the Mandate and consequently the territories turned to be what is known in international law as “sovereignty vacuum”)
169
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Israel, Egypt, and Jordan and they signed peace agreements, not being anymore belligerent, there is no more belligerent occupation.173
We shall see further down that the Ten Point Plan of the PLO
denies the application of international agreements to the situation in
the territories; logically, this also denies the application of the Geneva Conference Agreements.174
However, the pretension to apply Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention,175 which prohibits the occupying power from deporting or transferring parts of its civil population into the territory
it occupies, does not apply to the Palestinian territories because the
settlers came to the territories on their own initiative and occupy
mostly non-privately owned land to build their homes, under the
protection of the Israeli authorities.
Alan Baker clearly explained Israel’s interpretation of Article
49:
The prohibition concerning the transfer of the occupying power’s nationals to the occupied territory refers to forcible transfers, along the lines of what the
Nazis did. Article 49 was drafted after World War II
and is aimed at preventing the kind of mass population transfers the Germans carried out to alter the demographic character of the territories they occupied.
Israel’s policies ban forcible population transfers but
do sanction voluntary ones; Israel has refrained from
expropriating private land; the scale of the transfers
is too small to affect the territory’s character; and
what is most the transfers are not permanent.176
Eugene Rostov stated that “the Jewish settlers in the West Bank
are most emphatically volunteers. They have not been ‘deported’ or
‘transferred’ to the area by the Government of Israel, and their
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movement involves none of the atrocious purposes or harmful effects on the existing population it is the goal of the Geneva Convention to prevent.”177 In the words of Julius Stone:
Irony would be pushed to the absurdity of claiming
that Article 49(6) designed to prevent repetition of
Nazi-type genocidal policies of rendering Nazi metropolitan territories judenrein has now come to mean
that the West Bank must be made judenrein and must
be so maintained if necessary by the use of force by
the government of Israel against its own inhabitants.
Common sense as well as correct historical and functional context excludes so tyrannical a reading of Article 49(6).178
As the war of 1967 was a defensive war, to save Israel from the
murderous intentions of the Arab States when they brought their armies to the armistice lines with the declared intention of invading
and destroying the State of Israel, the same goes for the presence of
Israel in the West Bank territory – an absolute necessity to protect
Israel from further attacks, if not from foreign state armies, then
from the armies of terrorists, Fatah, Hamas, Hizbollah, and their allies and supporters, in sum, to replace the armistice lines that separated the Jewish from the Arab States, which Abba Eban defined as
the “Auschwitz borders.”179
Indeed, the occupation is actually a protective measure. Considering the thousands of victims murdered and maimed by the terrorist
attacks throughout the years, the Israeli population is much more in
need of humanitarian measures than the Palestinian people. Between
2000 and 2009, Palestinians killed around 1,200 and wounded 8,100
177
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Israelis in terror attacks.180 One can imagine what would happen if
Israel was not protected by the belt of the settlements. The Palestinians’ argument that the attacks are a reaction to the occupation is
unacceptable as the attacks have been occurring from the earliest
days of the State of Israel as well as before that, during the years of
the British mandate.181 All this leads to the conclusion that International Humanitarian Law demanded that Israel allow the settlements
as means to avoid new military attacks, more terrorist waves.
After Jordan and the Palestinians adopted the policy of executing any Arab who sold land to Jews, Israel allocated state lands for
the establishment of settlements, in keeping with the Mandate of the
League of Nations, which called for the facilitation of “close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not
required for public purposes” as stated in the League of Nations
Mandate for Palestine, Article Six.
The Security Council refers to “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force,” and, in the next paragraph, it calls Israel
“the occupying power.”182 A state cannot be seen as having acquired
territory by force and be seen as an occupying power at the same
time. The contradiction reveals the lack of precision and the carelessness with which the highest organ of the United Nations treats
the conflict.
HISTORY AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
The fundamental conflict between Israel and the Palestinians
turns on history: Who previously inhabited the territories? This
question brings out the conflict between both sides’ narratives and
raises the issue of whether history matters in the field of public international law.
In his comment on the 2334 Resolution, Theodor Meron declares that he “will discuss the situation of the West Bank as a matter
of public international law,” while refusing to address arguments
“based on grounds of religious or biblical entitlements.”183 However, in the case of the West Bank, like in any matter concerning the
180
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Holy Land, the Bible and religion are intimately connected with history which is a fundamental factor in international law.
The importance of history in the development of Public International Law, specifically the history of Judaism and the Bible, is
demonstrated in an essay published by the Netherlands International
Law Review. The author, the eminent Israeli internationalist Professor, Shabtai Rosenne, goes back to many of the worldly recognized
authorities of the last five centuries and quotes their statements on
the subject.184
Dominican Francisco de Vitoria and his successor Jesuit Francisco Suarez, Spanish Catholic writers known as the leading internationalists of the 16th century, “based many of their theories and
deductions upon classical history and literature, using to some extent
also the Old Testament.” In the 17th century, the Dutchman Hugo
Grotius, “in the view of many the real father of modern international
law,” cites the Old Testament fifty times and cites thirty post-biblical Hebrew sources (including the Talmudim, Targumim, and Midrashim).185
Shabtai Rosenne then refers to the Englishman John Selden, a
profound connoisseur of Jewish law and religion and shows how his
writing on the Seven Commandments of the Sons of Noahides lead
to the modern concept of human rights.186
Rosenne states that Selden “was the nearest any scholar has approached, before or since, to a comprehensive evaluation of the Jewish element in the basic notions of European international law.”187
Rosenne proceeds to discuss Samuel Pufendorf, who followed Selden in the references to Jewish law, having made “some 300 direct
citations from the Old Testament and from the Jewish Apocrypha.”188 From these facts, Rosenne concludes that “in the formative
or classical period of modern international law, nearly all the leading
figures, both Catholic and Protestant, deliberately drew upon Jewish
184
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legal and moral source-material, so that a definite influence of Jewish legal and moral thought derived principally, though not exclusively, from the Bible.”189 Laws of war, maritime frontiers, innocent
passage, and attainment of peace are matters of public international
law that Rosenne connects to biblical and more recent sources of
Jewish law.190 It may be concluded that when addressing the legal
aspects of the presence of Israelis in the West Bank, Israeli leaders
offer arguments based on religious and biblical sources, they are certainly in very good company.
We find a similar attitude in the great Catholic thinker Saint Augustine who wrote the following about law in general: “He who
would lay down temporal laws, will wisely consult the law eternal,
that he may discern amid its immutable rules what should be commanded and what forbidden.”191 Meron misses an important source
of international law when he refuses to address arguments based on
religious and biblical entitlements. Such a subject is critical when
considering matters related to a land that is so important in the histories of the three Abrahamic religions, especially considering that
Judaism and Islam have a history of conflict and tension.
Parallel to the Bible, the Qur’an must also be consulted. Abdul
Hadi Palazzi, professor and director of Rome’s Cultural Institute of
the Italian Islamic Community, quotes various passages of the Holy
Book of the Muslims about the intimate connection of the Jewish
people with the Holy Land:
“O my people, enter the Holy Land which God has assigned
unto you . . . (Sura V, vv 22-23)”192
“And thereafter We said to the Children of Israel – ‘Dwell
securely in the Promised Land.’ (Sura XVII v. 104).”193
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He also quotes various other passages of the Qur’an which connect the Jewish people to Jerusalem.194
Meron also stresses that he will not address “defense or strategic
issues.”195 However, defense issues are closely connected to humanitarian law. Why deal with the application of humanitarian law to
the Palestinian Arabs and not to the Jewish and non-Jewish Israelis,
who were victims of thousands of terrorist acts by the Palestinian
Arabs throughout the five decades since the Six-Day War, which
was a matter intimately connected with defense?
Chaïm Perelman, a modern legal philosopher, exposed the fundamental importance of history in every field of law. He wrote that
“rationality, as it presents itself in law, is always a form of continuity
– conformity to previous rules or justification of the new by means
of old values. That which is without attachment to the past can only
be imposed by force, not by reason.”196 Those with an interest in the
origins of modern law, of both the civil and common law systems,
are aware of the strong influence that Roman Law played in their
development, the interconnections between Roman and Canon
Laws, and the influence of the Old Testament on these systems.197
History of law, with its constant developments, is intimately connected with the history of humanity.198
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THE PEACE DESIDERATUM
Resolution 2334,199 a long list of previous Security Council’s
and General Assembly’s resolutions, various European initiatives
including the Quartet Roadmap referred to by Resolution 2334, and
innumerous initiatives of the U.S. government have all insisted on
the need to work towards the attainment of peace between Israel and
the Palestinians. Resolution 242 of 1967, the basic United Nations
Security Resolution on the territories, recommends that “immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start
between the parties . . . aimed at establishing a just and durable
peace in the Middle East.”200 Is peace between Israel and the Palestinians attainable?
ISRAEL’S PROCLAMATION
Israel’s Declaration of Independence states the following:
THE STATE OF ISRAEL will be open for Jewish
immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it
will foster the development of the country for the
benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets
of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social
and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective
of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of
religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions;
and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter
of the United Nations.|201
Further, the Declaration proclaims:
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WE APPEAL - in the very midst of the onslaught
launched against us now for months - to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and
participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis
of full and equal citizenship and due representation
in all its provisional and permanent institutions.
WE EXTEND our hand to all neighboring states and
their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighborliness, and appeal to them to establish bonds of cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish
people settled in its own land. The State of Israel is
prepared to do its share in a common effort for the
advancement of the entire Middle East.202
PALESTINIAN PROCLAMATIONS
The Palestinian National Charter of 1968 includes the Resolutions of the Palestine National Council approved from July 1 to July
17 of that year,203 which contain extremely aggressive statements
regarding the State of Israel.
Before referring to the aggressiveness, it is interesting to note
the uncertainty of the way the Charter of 1968 presents its people.
That comes out clearly in Article One, which states the following:
“Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an
indivisible part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are
an integral part of the Arab nation.”204 Article Four refers to “Palestinian identity,” Article Seven refers to the “Palestinian community,” and Article Nine refers to the “Palestinian Arab people.”205
Article 15 goes back to “Arab nation” and refers to “Arab people of
Palestine.”206 Article 22 repeats “Arab nation.” 207 So, we have
“Arab Palestinian people,” “Palestinian people,” “Palestinian Arab
202
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people,” “Arab nation,” “Palestinian identity,” “Palestinian community,” “Arab people of Palestine,” and regarding the land, we have
“Arab homeland.” This uncertain self-identification stems from the
fact that there is no such thing as Palestinian people. The majority
of the Arabs that live in the West Bank are descendants from Armenia, Turkey, Syria, and various other Arab countries attracted by the
Zionist pioneers that offered to pay for their work in the fields at the
end of the 19th century if they came to the Holy Land. Later, Arabs
encouraged by British authorities in the early 1900s migrated from
neighboring Arab countries.208 The presence of the so called “Palestinian Arabs” in Palestine “from time immemorial” is therefore an
absolute fiction.209
On March 3, 1977, the head of the Palestinian Liberation Organization Military Operations Department, Zuhair Muhsin, told the
Netherlands daily paper Trouw:
There are no differences between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese . . . .We are one people. Only for political reasons do we carefully underline our Palestinian identity. For it is of national interest for the Arabs to encourage the existence of the
Palestinians against Zionism. Yes, the existence of a
separate Palestinian identity is there only for tactical
reasons. The establishment of a Palestinian state is a
new expedient to continue the fight against Zionism
and for Arab unity.210
Romans named Palestine, which was invaded by different peoples of diverse religions; whereas Jews maintained their permanent
connection to the land throughout all of history.211 In the time of the
British Mandate, Jews, Christians, and Muslims were all known as
Palestinians. As such, they carried identity cards and passports. In
208
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sum, it is a total misrepresentation to intuit an exclusive connection
of Arabs with Palestine.
The total lack of historic-geographic reality is present in Article
Two of the Palestinian National Charter, which states the following:
“Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is
an indivisible territorial unit.”212 During the British Mandate, England detached the larger part of Palestine to create what is known
today as Jordan, which eliminated the pretended “indivisible
unit.”213 The Charter also asserts a repetitious set of aggressive statements regarding Zionism and the Jewish State.214 Article Four states
the “Zionist occupation,” Article Six states “Zionist invasion,” and
Article Eight states “the forces of Zionism and of imperialism.”215
Article 9:
Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine.
Thus, it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical
phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue
their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and
their return to it. They also assert their right to normal
life in Palestine and to exercise their right to self-determination and sovereignty over it. 216
Article 15:
The liberation of Palestine from an Arab viewpoint,
is a national duty and it attempts to repel the Zionist
and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland, and aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine. Absolute responsibility for this falls upon the
Arab nation—peoples and governments—with the
Arab people of Palestine in the vanguard . . . .217
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Article 19:
The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time, because they were contrary to the will of the Palestinian people and to their
natural right in their homeland, and inconsistent with
the principles embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations; particularly the right to self-determination.218
Article 20:
The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate for Palestine,
and everything that has been based upon them, are
deemed null and void. Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible
with the facts of history and the true conception of
what constitutes statehood. Judaism, being a religion,
is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own; they
are citizens to the States to which they belong.219
Article 21:
The Arab Palestinian people, expressing themselves
by the armed Palestinian revolution, reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total liberation of
Palestine and reject all proposals aiming at the liquidation of the Palestinian problem, or its internationalization.220
Finally, Article 22 provided the characterization to the Jewish
presence in the Holy Land:
Zionism is a political movement organically associated with international imperialism and antagonistic
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to all action for liberation and to progressive movements in the world. It is racist and fanatic in its nature, aggressive, expansionist, and colonial in its
aims, and fascist in its methods. Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement and geographical base
for world imperialism placed strategically in the
midst of the Arab homeland to combat the hopes of
the Arab nation for liberation, unity and progress. Israel is a constant source of threat vis-a-vis peace in
the Middle East and the whole world . . . .221
This is a very special document because it is unique in its absurdities and aggressiveness. The Palestinian National Charter of
1964 preceded this charter and proclaimed the following: “Palestine,
with its boundaries at the time of the British Mandate, is a[n] indivisible territorial unit.”222 Articles 17 and 18 denounce and classify
the Balfour Declaration, the “Palestine Mandate System,” and all
that has been based on them as “illegal, null and void.”223 Finally,
Article 19 denounces Zionism as a “colonialist movement in its
goal, racist in its configurations and fascist in its means and aims, a
permanent source of tension and turmoil in the Middle East in particular, and to the international community in general.”224
In 1974, the Palestine Liberation Organization came out with
another document, denominated “Ten Point Plan,” confirming and
reaffirming the points contained in the Charter of 1968.225 Some of
the objectives of this Plan are the following:
Article 1:
To reaffirm the Palestine Liberation Organization’s
previous attitude to Resolution 242, which obliterates the national right of our people and deals with
221
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the cause of our people as a problem of refugees. The
Council therefore refuses to have anything to do with
this resolution at any level, Arab or international, including the Geneva Conference. 226
Article 2:
The Palestine Liberation Organization will employ
all means, and first and foremost armed struggle, to
liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the independent combatant national authority for the people over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated. This will require further changes being effected in the balance of power in favor of our people
and their struggle.227
Article 3:
The Liberation Organization will struggle against
any proposal for a Palestinian entity the price of
which is recognition, peace, secure frontiers, renunciation of national rights and the deprival of our people of their right to return and their right to self-determination on the soil of their homeland.228
In 1957, Fatah, the military branch of the Palestinian organization, issued its founding document, which declares, among others,
the following points:
Article 12: “Complete liberation of Palestine, and eradication of
Zionist economic, political, military and cultural existence.” 229
Article 19: “Armed struggle is a strategy and not a tactic, and the
Palestinian Arab People’s armed revolution is a decisive factor in
the liberation fight and in uprooting the Zionist existence, and this
struggle will not cease unless the Zionist state is demolished and
Palestine is completely liberated.”230
226
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Article 22: “Opposing any political solution offered as an alternative to demolishing the Zionist occupation in Palestine, as well as
any project intended to liquidate the Palestinian case or impose any
international mandate on its people.”231
Going back to the original Charter of 1968, it is interesting to
quote Article 24 which states that “the Palestinian people believe in
the principles of justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination,
human dignity and the right of all peoples to exercise them.”232 Unfortunately, among the Palestinian Arabs as among most of the Arab
peoples the following is a reality: (1) there is no justice as individuals suspected of treason are executed without any court of law judgment; (2) there is no freedom as media is totally controlled by the
governing forces; and (3) there is no human dignity as women are
dominated by men and by the local dictatorships, homosexuals are
not allowed to live, and whole populations are submitted to the diktat of those who managed to get hold of power.
Then comes the vehement, fanatical, hateful “Covenant of the
Islamic Resistance Movement” (Hamas Covenant) of August 18,
1988, pretending to represent authentic Muslim religious beliefs and
principles, an eye-opener to the murderous, terrorist mentality which
inspires this organization; Hamas is a close ally of the PLO, at least
as far as the war against Israel is concerned.233
Here are some of the statements contained in the Introduction of
the Hamas Covenant:
Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam
will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before
it . . . .Our struggle against the Jews is very great and
very serious. It needs all sincere efforts. It is a step
that inevitably should be followed by other steps.
The Movement is but one squadron that should be
supported by more and more squadrons from this
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vast Arab and Islamic world, until the enemy is vanquished and Allah’s victory is realised.234
In Article Two, the Covenant proclaims that its movement is
“one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine.” 235 Article
7 includes the famous call against the Jews that proclaims, “The day
of Judgment will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The
stones and trees will say: ‘O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew
behind me, come and kill him.’”236 Article 22 accuses the Jews of
having been behind all important events of the last centuries, including the French Revolution, the Communist Revolution, the First
World War, and the Second World War. “It was they who instigated
the replacement of the League of Nations with the United Nations
and the Security Council to enable them to rule the world through
them. There is no war going on anywhere without having their finger
in it.”237
Article 28 is the best demonstration of how hate can blind:
The Zionist invasion is a vicious invasion. It does not
refrain from resorting to all methods, using all evil
and contemptible ways to achieve its end. It relies
greatly in its infiltration and espionage operation on
the secret organizations it gave rise to, such as the
Freemasons, the Rotary and Lions clubs and other
sabotage groups. All these organizations, whether secret or open, work in the interest of Zionism and according to its instructions. They aim at undermining
societies, destroying values, corrupting consciences,
deteriorating character and annihilating Islam. It is
behind the drug trade and alcoholism in all its kinds
so as to facilitate its control and expansion.238
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Article 28 closes with the following jewel: “We should not forget to remind every Moslem that when the Jews conquered the Holy
City in 1967, they stood on the threshold of the Aqsa Mosque and
proclaimed that ‘Mohammed is dead and his descendants are all
women.”239
Article 31 states that “The Zionist Nazi activities against our
people will not last for long.”240
Hamas’ opposition to any peace agreement with Israel materializes in Article 32, which condemns the peace agreement achieved
between Israel and Egypt and declares:
World Zionism together with imperialistic powers
try through a studied plan and an intelligent strategy
to remove one Arab state after another from the circle
of struggle against Zionism, in order to have it finally
face the Palestinian people only. Egypt was, to a
great extent, removed from the circle of the struggle,
through the treacherous Camp David Agreement.
They are trying to draw other Arab countries into
similar agreements and to bring them outside the circle of struggle.241
Under the title of “The Testimony of History,” the Charter of
Hamas goes back to the war between the Crusaders and the Muslims
and the liberation of Palestine, which came after a twenty-year-war
against the Christians.242
To know the truth about the PLO, Fatah, and Hamas, to know of
their intentions, desiderata, policies, and to estimate the possibility
of any kind of peace agreement with Israel, one has to read their
Charters, which are full of hate, venom, and clearly determined to

239

HAMAS Covenant, supra note 233. However, when the Israeli Army entered the Old City of Jerusalem, the Defense Minister Moshe Dayan handed the
control of the Aqsa Mosque and the whole plateau where it is located to the Muslim religious authorities, a deed which has been criticized considering the difficulties that the Jews are having since then to enter the location which is holy to
them for many more centuries than for the Muslims. Id.
240
Id. art. 31.
241
Id. art. 32.
242
Id. art. 34.

2019]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

107

the destruction of the state of Israel. These Charters recall the succession of terrorist acts they have committed throughout seventy
years since the proclamation of the Jewish State, and the financial
prizes that the terrorists and their families receive from the Palestinian establishment.243 To be convinced of the Palestinian maintenance of their waring spirit, one should listen to the speeches of their
leaders Arafat and Abu Mazen, especially those made in Arab and
directed to their people.
What is important for the analysis of the conflict and to estimate
the possibility of attaining peace—as the Security Council insists in
all its Resolutions—is that, Israel accepted Resolution 181 of the
UN General Assembly,244 which decided upon the partition between
Jews and Arabs of what was left of Palestine and for each to create
its own state, and Israel also accepted Resolution 242 of the Security
Council, which decided on devolution of territories conditioned to
the establishment of peace between the warring sides.245 On the
other hand, the Palestinian Arabs have declared the illegality of all
documents, starting from the Balfour Declaration through Resolution 181 and Resolution 242.246
As already noted before, considering the Arabs’ refusal to accept
Resolution 181,247 the resolution became invalid. The Jewish right
to its state goes back to article 80 of the UN Charter and, before that,
to all international legal acts that preceded it, from the Balfour Dec-
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laration to the creation by the League of Nations of the British Mandate for Palestine;248 that right covers the whole territory from the
Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River.249
Eugen Rostov put it very emphatically when he asked “how can
the (Geneva) Convention be deemed to apply to Jews who do have
a right to settle in the territories under international law? – a legal
right assured by treaty and specifically protected by Article 80 of the
United Nations Charter, generally known as the ‘the Palestinian article.’”250
The Arab Palestinians have been coherent and consistent
throughout the long conflict because they do not recognize the right
of Jews to any part of the Holly Land and consider the Zionist movement which created the state of Israel imperialist and fascist, and as
they vow to destroy the “Zionist entity,” they must declare the “illegality” of the Balfour Declaration and the UN resolutions, beginning
with the Partition Plan of 1947251 and proceeding with the refusal to
accept Resolution 242 which resulted from the Six Day War of
1967.252
Based on this review of the Palestinian’s official positions, it is
easier to understand why all trials to attain peace have failed. The
historic consensus is that, whereas in all the meetings, starting from
Madrid in 1991,253 Israeli’s Prime Minister Rabin’s offer in 1993,254
his successor Ehud Barak’s propositions in Camp David in 2000255
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and in Taba in 2001,256 Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s meeting with
Abbas in Aqaba,257 the retreat of Israel from Gaza in 2005, 258 and
Prime Minister Olmert’s peace offer to Abbas in 2007 in Annapolis,259 Israel was ready with offers containing serious wide-ranging
concessions, but the Palestinian Arabs systematically rejected them,
never offering any counteroffers and never ready for any concessions.
In his autobiography, Bill Clinton tells how four days before he
left office—six months after the Camp David meeting between Israeli prime minister Barak and PLO leader Arafat, under the U.S.
President’s chairmanship—he made a last trial to achieve a peace
agreement, presenting to Israel and to the Palestinians what he called
“parameters” which were all in favor of the Palestinians, even handing them the Temple Mount—the holiest site for the Jewish people—besides conceding all their other demands. He reports how Israel accepted the “parameters” and the Palestinians refused to
agree.260
In the last decade of the 20th century, the Palestinians proclaimed that they had adopted decisions to abrogate those provision
of the PLO Charter that contradict the correspondence exchanged
between Yasser Arafat and Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin,

cles/2001/08/09/camp-david-the-tragedy-of-errors/ (“In accounts of what happened at the July 2000 Camp David summit and the following months of IsraeliPalestinian negotiations, we often hear about Ehud Barak’s unprecedented offer
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but no new Charter was ever drawn.261 In the early years of the 21st
century, various Palestinian leaders came out with clear statements
that their Charter continues in effect.262
At the 6th Conference of the PLO in 2009, President Abu Mazen
(known as Abbas) declared that the PLO Charter of 1968 constitutes
part of the identity of the Palestine Liberation Organization and
formed the basis of the organization’s political program,263 and as
recently as 2013, on the occasion of the 49th anniversary of the
founding of the PLO, he made clear that the original goal of the
movement—the destruction of Israel—remains the goal of the
movement.264 Glick adds that in a post on Abbas’ official Facebook
page from October 11, 2012, Abbas referred to all of Israel as occupied Palestine, making clear that he rejected Israel’s right to exist
within any borders.265
While negotiations were going on, the education of the Palestinian children in school and the indoctrination of the Palestinian population in their mosques and on their television proceeded with its
continuous, perverse incitement against Israel, which is in the exact
spirit of their official documents. How could a Palestinian leader
reach a peace accord in contradiction with their Charters and against
the understanding and the feelings prevailing in his people as a consequence of the education that the same leader has ordered? The example of the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat who signed the peace
treaty with Israel and was murdered by the Muslim Brotherhood remains an unforgettable lesson for any future Palestinian leader that
might adopt a different approach.266

261
Khaled Abu Toameh, Kaddoumi: PLO Charter Was Never Changed,
JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 22, 2004, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/1122629/posts.
262
See Charter of 1968, supra note 203.
263
Einhorn, supra note 132, § 4.2.
264
GLICK, supra note 74, at 248‒49 (quoting Evelyn Gordon, Abas PLO
Charter Reflects What Palestinians Want, Cᴏᴍᴍᴇɴᴛᴀʀʏ (June 3, 2013),
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/foreign-policy/middle-east/israel/abbasplo-charter-reflects-what-palestinians-want/.
265
Id. at 73.
266
KENNETH W. STEIN, HEROIC DIPLOMACY: SADAT, KISSINGER, CARTER,
BEGIN, AND THE QUEST FOR ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE xi (1999) (“Along the way, he
put his political and personal life on the line and was assassinated in October 1981.

2019]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

111

That the UN organs continue insisting on peace is understandable; it is a simple manifestation of the hypocrisy that rules the world
organization, a hostage of the Muslim-Asian-African conglomerate.
What is not comprehensible is that an experienced legal scholar as
Theodor Meron adheres to such a phantasy when he writes that Israel’s “disrespect of an international convention would have such a
direct impact on the elimination of any realistic prospects for reconciliation, not to mention peace.”267
One cannot take the UN Resolutions seriously after blaming Israel for its occupation of the West Bank, condemning it as an illegal
occupier. It is obvious that the occupation is not illegal because it
happened in a defensive war and its permanence is equally so because the Security Council—in Resolution 242—conditioned the return of occupied territories (not all occupied territories) to the attainment of peace.268
RESOLUTION 2334 VERSUS RESOLUTION 242
Resolution 242, which followed the Six Day War and to which
all further Security Resolutions allude, did not even refer to the establishment of a Palestinian state besides the one already in existence on the East Bank of the Jordan river, the state of Jordan.269
Resolution 242 states that the fulfillment of United Nations Charter
principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in
the Middle East which includes the following:
[W]ithdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories
(not all territories) occupied in the recent conflict,
termination of all claims or states of belligerency and
respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of
For a decade, Sadat’s accommodation with Israel had made Egypt a pariah among
Arab states.”).
267
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268
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269
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war ended, the Palestinians were so marginal that they were not even mentioned
in UN Security Council Resolution 242 and that this Resolution, which notes that
all states in the region had the “right to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries,” assumed that Israel could not return to the 1949 armistice lines).
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every State in the area and their right to live in peace
within secure and recognized boundaries free from
threats or acts of force.270
When Resolution 2334 classifies Israel’s presence in the territories as illegal, it blatantly contradicts Resolution 242 which did not
demand the withdrawal of all territories and did not even refer expressly to the territories in Palestine (the withdrawal could refer exclusively to the presence of Israeli troops in Egyptian and Syrian
territories) and conditioned these withdrawals to the attainment of
just and lasting peace.271
As Joseph Spoerl wrote:
It is highly significant that Resolution 2334 begins
with an explicit re-affirmation of Resolution 242. In
doing so, it imposes a (historically false) reinterpretation on the text of Resolution 242. According to
this inaccurate reinterpretation, Resolution 242 calls
for Israel to withdraw from all the territories occupied in 1967 and presupposes the sacrosanctity of the
1949 armistice lines as if they were the agreed-upon
international frontiers between Israel and her neighbors.272
A strong position was enunciated by Eugene V. Rostov when he
wrote that “the Israeli occupation of those areas is not only sanctioned, but in effect directed, by the international agreements embodied in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 . . . .”273 “These
two resolutions,” Rostov explains, “constitute a legally binding ‘decision’ that the Israeli occupation should continue until Israel and
the Arab states of the region establish ‘a just and lasting peace in the
Middle East.’”274
270
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It is indeed striking how Resolution 2334, though opening with
the reiteration of Resolution 242 (and all the other Resolutions of
the Security Council), flagrantly contradicts that first and basic resolution and the successive agreements between the parties.275 As
Ambassador Alan Baker writes:
Obama and Kerry are running counter to the 1967
Security Council resolution 242, which is the basis
for all of the Arab-Israeli peace process which calls
for negotiation of ‘secure and recognized boundaries’. The Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords make no
specific reference to the 1967 lines. As such this reference would appear to be an attempt to prejudge or
unduly influence the negotiating issue of borders.276
Baker adds:
this position taken by the United States (as well as
the other members of the Security Council) also undermines the basic obligation of the Oslo Accords,
signed by the PLO and witnessed by the United
States (as well as the EU, Russia, Egypt and others)
that the permanent status of the territories, the issues
of Jerusalem, and borders are to be negotiated.
Gorali quotes Baker, stating that “after we signed those accords,
we are no longer an occupying power, but we are instead present in
the territories with their consent and subject to the outcome of negotiations.”277
Another severe critique on Resolution 2334 was authored by
Colin Rubinstein who sustains that:
[I]t has made peacemaking between Israel and the
Palestinians immeasurably more difficult by empowering the Palestinian strategy of refusing to negotiate
with Israel and “internationalising” the conflict – that
275
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is, bypassing negotiating entirely and leveraging international pressure to achieve Palestinian nationalistic and territorial objectives on their behalf and
without having to accept Israel as a Jewish state,
make genuine concessions or end the conflict.278
And then he quotes another statement of Alan Baker: “Why
would the Palestinians want to negotiate with Israel on these things
if they’ve got a Security Council resolution that basically determines
that east Jerusalem and all the territories belong to them?”279
Also, the following is a very important observation contained in
the same analysis of the resolution:
It fails to distinguish between settlement blocs near
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv – where most Israeli settlers
live and all serious observers concede will remain
part of Israel under any conceivable two state outcome – and isolated outposts . . . . Even worse, it includes Jewish neighbourhoods in Jerusalem, home to
hundreds of thousands of people and, absurdly, even
the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and the Western
Wall of the biblical Jewish temple, to be ‘Palestinian
territory occupied since 1967.’ In short the language
of Resolution 2334 is a major setback for peace because it erases hard-earned compromises on a number of issues made in previous rounds of negotiations.280
The basic point of 242 was the obligation that “Israel withdraws
its armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” All
interpretations coincide that the withdrawal would be from “territories” but not from “the territories.”281 There is unanimity among
278
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scholars and historians, as well as among the diplomats that participated in the negotiations for the drafting of the 1967 resolution that
Israel’s armed forces would not have to withdraw from all territories
occupied by its army. One of the basic points of 242 is that the withdrawal of Israel’s armed forces would occur as per an agreement to
be made as stated in paragraph 3 of the Resolution.282
A simple reading of the Resolution leads to the understanding
that the withdrawal established in article 1 (i) is connected and depends of the materialization of article 1 (ii) – termination of all
claims or states of belligerency and respect and acknowledgment of
the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and
recognized boundaries free from threats of acts of force.283
Moreover, the withdrawal referred to in the 1967 Resolution is
of “armed forces” which does not affect settlements where civilians
live and work.284
As the Arabs in the so called “territories” have not given Israel
a moment of peace with their continuous murderous terrorist attacks,
in frontal disrespect of letter (ii) and maintain the criminal intent of
destroying the Jewish State as established in their charters, the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the conflict equally does not apply.285
In sum there is no obligation for Israel to withdraw armed forces
and or civilian settlements from the area.
A NEW PALESTINIAN STATE
The UN Resolutions and the Quartet Roadmap all insist that
their main objective is the establishment of peace. Well, as Talia
Einhorn stresses, “the dangers threatening Israel from the establishment of a Palestinian state on land to the west of the Jordan River
should deter anyone, desiring and seeking a true peace, from supporting such a ‘solution’ to the Arab-Israel dispute, before the conditions to peaceful co-existence are met . . . .”286
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Since its establishment, Israel has met not peace but violence of
the worst kind. As the same scholar writes:
[T]he establishment of the Palestinian Authority
should serve as a guide to the grave risks posed by
such an Arab state, which may eventually lead to the
destruction of the Jewish state . . . .The preconditions
for a true peace require the Palestinians to lay down
their arms and renounce terror and violence; to draft
a new charter to replace the Palestinian National
Charter of 1968, to recognize Israel as the state of the
Jewish people and put an end to incitement against it
and to anti-Jewish hate propaganda . . . .Palestinians
must be ready for true peace and mutual respect in
speech and deed. As long as these conditions are not
fulfilled, the coming into effect of any agreement
should be suspended on grounds of ordre public international.287
The basic problem is the Palestinian’s rejection of the Jewish
people’s national rights as they are not willing to accept that Israel
is the state of the Jewish people. This has been their consistent view
and policy throughout the whole conflict. That explains their recent
initiative to demand from the English government a retraction of the
1917 Balfour Declaration.288 Without a total change of attitude,
there is no possibility of peace.
After such fundamental changes are implemented in the Palestinian mind and in their system, at least 20 years would have to go
by, until a new generation, with a new mentality regarding Israel and
the Jews in general would come up, ready to concede and to make
peace.
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CONCLUSIONS
Israel’s presence in the territories is in compliance with the international documents that established the right of the Jewish people
over this territory. The concession made by the Jews to the Palestinians by accepting Resolution 181 of the UN General Assembly in
1947 expired due to the Arabs’ refusal, which turned the legal status
of the territory back to the Jewish people and consequently to the
State of Israel.
Resolution 242, on which Resolution 2334 pretends to base itself, does not refer to “Palestinian territory,” nor to “1967 lines,”
both of which constitute innovations of the more recent resolution
and are without any factual support and are devoid of any legal basis.
Even for those who divorce law from history, Israel is still not
an occupying power in the sense of the Geneva Convention as its
presence in the territories derived from a defensive war into which
she was forced by the attacking Arab armies. So, even if we were
not to accept that the territories belong exclusively to the Jewish
State, the belligerent attitude of the Palestinians demands that Israel
and the settlements continue in the territories as a defense against
terrorist attacks.
The application of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the situation in the territories has become a non-issue since 1995 (Oslo Accords) when the government of the territories was transferred to the
PLO. Moreover, the Convention establishes various exceptions to
its basic principle of protection of inhabitants of occupied territories
whenever a matter of security is involved.289
The International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion has no legal
basis, and it is a worthless document totally divorced from the historical facts recognized by historians and legal scholars and without
any reference to legal sources as demanded in its statute.
The Palestinians’ standards of living improved considerably as
long as they were under the administration of Israel, which committed no violation of humanitarian law. Regarding “demolition of
homes and displacement of Palestinian civilians” referred to in the
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Preamble of the Resolution,290 any confiscation of Palestinian property was duly compensated, as well described by the Israeli Supreme
Court in one of its important judgment connected to the erection of
the protective fence as reported above.291 The suffering of the Palestinian people derives from the treatment they receive from the
leadership of their organizations, especially since 1995 when Israel
transferred to them the administration of the territories.
A “two-State solution” is only possible when there is such a will
in both parties. The Charters of all Palestinian organizations are
clear about their refusal to accept the State of Israel, declaring the
intention of destroying it. Throughout all the years of the “occupation,” the leaders of the Palestinians have coherently maintained the
aims of their Charters. A promise to change the main Charter has
never been accomplished. So there is no possibility of a “two-State
solution.”
The vision of the Security Council of “two democratic states living side by side in peace” 292 is a ludicrous dream. Is there a Palestinian democratic state or any plan to create one? To what Palestinian organization does the Security Council address this illusion—to
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) or to Hamas? Does
the Security Council not know that after Yasir Arafat’s dictatorship,
his heir Abu Mazen (Abbas) proceeds in the same path? Does the
Security Council not realize the lack of democratic life amongst the
Palestinians—the wide-ranging violations of basic human rights under which they live?
And how does the Security Council foresee Palestine and Israel
“living side by side in peace”293 and establishing the two-State solution? Do the Palestinians wish to live in peace with Israel? What
about the incitement in their schools, mosques and the press against
Israel, against the Jews, and against peace? The Resolution’s condemnation of “all acts of violence against civilians, acts of terror,
provocation, incitement and destruction”294 should have been addressed exclusively to the Palestinian organizations, to their school
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system, religious and cultural propaganda viewing terror and destruction, and to their patronizing the terrorists whom they “compensate” for their criminal actions by showering them and the families of dead terrorists (whom they treat as “martyrs”) with ultragenerous monthly subsidies and by honoring their memories.
The Security Council became a loyal serf of the radical Islamic
states and submissive to the systematic falsities and lies of the Palestinians, which are supported by a large and democratic group of
states that, for one reason or another, accept blindly a false narrative
and remain hostages to legal terrorism.
The Security Council does not invoke one source, one authority,
one scholarly work to base its repetitive claim that settlements constitute a “flagrant violation under international law.”295 The contrary
is true; all the great authorities of public international law not only
recognized the validity of Israel’s military defense in the Six-Day
War, but accepted Israel’s permanence in the territories. Between a
military occupation and the settlements, the second option is the pacific one. The Security Council does not explain why the presence
of Israeli settlers is an obstacle to peace and to a “two-state solution.” A million and a half Palestinians live in Israel, earn a reasonable living, and have all civil and political rights. So, why cannot
half a million Israelis live in the Palestinian “democratic state” that
the UN fools itself about?
The reference to “4 June 1967 lines” 296 is a total absurdity as
there were never such lines. The Security Council accepts any falsity
that is put in front of it by the Palestinian and or the Arab states.
Moreover, Resolution 242 calls for the negotiation of “secure and
recognized boundaries” and the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords
make no specific reference to the 1967 lines. As such, this reference
would appear to be an attempt to prejudge or unduly influence the
negotiating issue. When the Security Council “calls upon all
States . . . to distinguish, in their dealings, between the territory of
the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967,”297 it is
expressing a clear support of the BDS campaign, a manifest call for
boycotting. The Arab leadership does not care for the well-being of
295
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its people which improves with the presence of Israeli enterprises in
the territories. The Security Council follows the Palestinians’ policies as it does not mind to harm them, provided it can follow the
demonization of the State of Israel.
The Security Council refrains from naming who are the practitioners of acts of violence against civilians—including the terrorists,
the organizers and executors of the Intifadas, the inciters, the provocateurs, the cruel leaders of the PLO, of Fatah, of Hamas, and the
brothers of the Muslim Brotherhood—that have conducted attacks
of all sorts against the Israeli population, that have killed children in
kindergartens and civilian passengers in buses, that invaded homes
and murdered whole families, and stormed into synagogues and
killed people during their prayers. These practitioners have committed thousands of terrorist acts that have resulted in thousands of
deaths and many thousands of incapacitated civilians. Regarding
this atrocious campaign, the Security Council is numb.298
And so, Resolution 2234 will go down in the history of the UN
as one of the most absurd, illegal, unfair, and unjust acts of the world
organization, prisoner of the Muslim-Arab-African-Asian conglomerate that has succeeded in bringing many democratic states to their
knees.
The UN started its illegal and invalid persecution of the State of
Israel with the General Assembly’s Resolution 2253 of July 4, 1967,
which stated the following:
“The General Assembly
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Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in Jerusalem as a result of the measures taken by Israel to
change the status of the City,
1.

Considers that these measures are invalid;

2.
Calls upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking action
which would alter the status of Jerusalem.”299
The Jordanian government was the one that changed the status
of Jerusalem with its occupation of the Old City, violating Resolution 181 that had established an international regime for the city. On
this prejudiced approach, I have written the following:
When the events are contrary to the interests of Israel, when the Arabs disrespect rules established by
the UN, no measures are taken, no resolutions are approved regarding their violations. But when Israel
defends its security and its interests, a shower of resolutions rains down from the United Nations, proclaiming the illegality of the new situation created by
the Jewish State. This is political terrorism.300
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